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II. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION.
This is an appeal of a final judgment and related order
entered after trial on the merits by The Honorable William w.
Barrett for the Third District Court, Division II. The Utah
Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to decide this appeal pursuant
to Utah Code Ann. Section 78-2a-3(2)(j) and Rule 3(a) of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Under Utah Rule of Appellate

Procedure 29(b), the case falls under oral argument priority 15.

III.

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES.

Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1) is determinative of a
portion of appellant's appeal.

It states:

(1) To whom awarded. Except when express
provision therefor is made either in a statute of this
state or in these rules, costs shall be awarded as of
course to the prevailing party unless the court
otherwise directs; provided, however, where an appeal
or other proceeding for review is taken, costs of the
action, other than costs in connection with such appeal
or other proceeding for review, shall abide the final
determination of the cause. Costs against the State if
Utah, its officers and agencies shall be imposed only
to the extent permitted by law.
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1).
IV.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

This case is to determine the proper lawyer's fees the
appellant, a lawyer, is to be awarded for a lawsuit in which he
represented the appellee and recovered $3,250.00 in settlement.
Appellant claimed he should be awarded either a 100% contingent
I

fee according to an unsigned fee agreement or a $10,000 fee award
in quantum meruit.

Appellee claimed the appellant should be

awarded a one-third contingent fee plus costs, according to a
verbal agreement between the parties which appellee memorialized
in correspondence and which appellee made a condition for
appellant's acceptance of the settlement offers on appellee's
behalf.
The trial court entered judgment according to appellee's
theory of the case, awarding appellant a one-third contingent fee
plus costs in the previous lawsuit, plus sanctions previously
ordered against appellee, denying appellant's application for
costs in this action.

Appellee brought a Rule 59(a) motion to

amend the judgment based on insufficiency of the evidence and
error in law.

The trial court denied the motion.

After

judgment, on appellee's motion, the trial court ordered appellant
to pay to appellee the balance of the settlement proceeds less
the judgment amount (the order).

Appellant appeals from the

judgment and order.

V.

STATEMENT OF FACTS.

In December, 1994, appellee sought appellant's advice
regarding a landlord tenant dispute and a minor assault by a
roommate.

Record on Appeal, pp. 729:4-730:4.

From that dispute,

appellant brought a lawsuit for multiple claims of conspiracy
against the landlord, the other tenant, the house sitter, the
2

landlord's lawyer and the lawyer's firm, styled Reza Semnani v.
Carolyn Clark, Brian Barkey, Robert Rees and Fabian & Clendenin,
#950901241PI (the previous lawsuit).

The claims against the

lawyer and law firm were dismissed with prejudice and found to be
frivolous.

Defendant's Exhibit 15; Record on Appeal, pp. 782:19-

784:14 SL 836:24-837:1.

Shortly after those claims were

dismissed, the landlord (Clark) and other tenant (Barkey) settled
the claims against them for $3,250.00. Record on Appeal pp.
769:22-770:4.
Appellant never had a formal, written contract with
appellee.

Although there was no written agreement between them,

appellant initiated the lawsuit and otherwise represented
appellee.

At various times, including on or about January 18,

1995, and eleven months later on or about December 15, 1995,
appellant presented to appellee a proposed, retroactive fee
agreement (the proposed agreement).

Plaintiff's Exhibit 5;

Defendant's Exhibit 2; Record on Appeal pp. 758:8-22 & 808:19-23.
The proposed agreement allowed for a 100% contingent fee.
Appellee never signed the proposed agreement and never agreed to
any of its terms.

Substantial confusion over appellant's

compensation ensued.

Record on Appeal pg. 898:18-23 & 899:11-24.

Appellee resolved that confusion by giving appellant authority to
accept the Clark and Barkey offers on condition that appellant
accept a one-third contingent fee.

3

Record on Appeal, pg. 899:11-

900:8.

Appellant assented to that condition and accepted the

offers on those terms. Id. Plaintiff's Exhibit 11, pp. 10 & 11.
Appellant accepted the $3250.00 from Clark and Barkey but
refused to tender any portion of it to appellee, claiming to be
entitled to the entire settlement proceeds.
13; Record on Appeal, pg. 770:2-4.

Defendant's Exhibit

Appellant also had accepted

from Clark a check for the return of appellee's rental deposit
but refused to give it to appellee.

Record on Appeal, pg. 770:5-

21.

VI. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT.
A.

THERE IS AMPLE EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE TRIAL
COURT'S JUDGMENT.

The Court of Appeals "presumes the findings of fact of the
trial court to be correct."

Gillmor v. Gillmor, 745 P.2d 461,

462 (Utah App. 1987) . "Findings of fact, whether based on oral
or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly
erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of
the trial court to judge the credibility of witnesses."
52(a).

U.R.C.P.

Here, the trial court painstakingly considered the

conflicting evidence before making its findings.

There is clear

and ample evidence to support them.
B.
APPELLANT FAILED TO MARSHALL THE EVIDENCE
IN SUPPORT OF HIS APPEAL.
To challenge the trial court's fact findings successfully,
it is the appellant's burden to cite all the evidence in the
4

record in support of the judgment, including all reasonable
inferences, and then demonstrate why, even when viewed in the
light most favorable to the trial court, the evidence is
insufficient to support the finding under attack.
Ltd. v. Finlinson, 782 P.2d 467 (Utah 1989);

Grayson Roper,

Harker v.

Condominiums Forest Glen. Inc., 740 P.2d 1361, 1362

(Utah Ct.

App. 1987) . Here, appellant has done just the opposite.
Appellant merely has presented the evidence favorable to his case
and in the light least favorable to the trial court's judgment.
It is neither this Court's nor appellee's burden to search the
record for evidence which supports the judgment.

Appellant has

failed altogether to carry his burden to marshall the evidence.
C.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED
THE CLAIM FOR QUANTUM MERUIT.

Where there is an enforceable, expressed contract, it will
be enforced in lieu of the equitable remedy of quantum meruit.
Bailey-Allen Co., Inc. v. Kurzet, 876 P.2d 421, 425 (Utah App.
1994).

Here, based on its finding of an express, verbal

agreement between the parties by which appellant would accept a
one-third contingent fee, the trial court correctly concluded
that the equitable remedy of quantum meruit did not apply.
Record on Appeal, pg. 900:19-25.
D.

THE TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT ALSO MAY BE
UPHELD ON A THEORY OF QUANTUM MERUIT.

The Court of Appeals may uphold the trial court's judgment
on any proper grounds.

DeBry v. Noble, 889 P.2d 428, 444 (Utah
5

1995).

Here, the trial court's judgment may be upheld even if

quantum meruit applies to appellant's claims.
E.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING
APPELLANT'S CLAIM FOR COSTS.

The party whose theory of the case is accepted by the trier
of fact prevails.

Here, appellant proposed he should awarded a

100% contingent fee or a quantum meruit award of $9,999.99.
Record on Appeal, pg.

Appellee proposed appellant should be

awarded a one-third contingent fee plus costs in the previous
action.

The Court awarded appellant a one-third contingent fee

plus costs in the previous action.

Although the judgment awards

money to appellant it is in the amount which appellee proposed.
Appellee prevailed. Appellee could be awarded costs but he
incurred no recoverable costs and submitted no cost bill.
The trial court's judgment to charge neither party costs is
within its discretion and should stand.
F.

APPELLEE APPLIES TO RECOVER THE FEES HE INCURS
TO DEFEND AGAINST THIS FRIVOLOUS APPEAL.

Pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 33, appellee
applies to the Court to recover the attorney's fees he will spend
in defense of this appeal.

Appellee understands the Rule 33

remedy only applies in egregious cases and he makes this
application cautiously and advisedly.
P.2d 365,

See Porco v. Porco, 752

(Utah Ct. App. 1988). But the present appeal has no

reasonable legal or factual basis, has been taken with no
reasonable likelihood of prevailing, is frivolous, and never
6

should have been brought.

See Id. ;

306, 309-11 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).

O'Brien v. Rushf 744 P.2d

Appellee respectfully requests

the Court to award him the attorney's fees he will incur to
defend this frivolous appeal.

VII. ARGUMENT.
A.

THERE IS AMPLE EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE TRIAL
COURT'S JUDGMENT.

The Court of Appeals "presumes the findings of fact of the
trial court to be correct."
462 (Utah App. 1987).

Gillmor v. Gillmor, 745 P.2d 461,

On review, the Court "views the evidences

and all the inferences that can reasonably be drawn therefrom in
a light most supportive of the trial court's findings." Id.
quoting

Horton v. Horton, 695 P.2d 102, 106 (Utah 1984).

"Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence,
shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard
shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the
credibility of witnesses."

U.R.C.P. 52(a).

Here, the trial

court painstakingly considered the conflicting evidence before
making its findings.
support them.

There is clear and ample evidence to

Two examples suffice.

First, the trial court found appellee never signed or agreed
to the proposed fee agreement appellant attempted to enforce by
this action.

Record on Appeal, pg. 898:12-23.

In support of

that finding, the trial court considered evidence that appellant
7

proposed the fee agreement to appellee several different times.
Appellant's Exhibit 5; Appellee's Exhibit 2;

Record on Appeal

pp. 758:8-22 & 808:19-23. Each time appellant proposed the
agreement, appellee rejected it.

807:25-809:8.

Appellee

expressed in correspondence that he never agreed to the proposed
agreement and was not bound by its terms.

Defendant's Exhibit 6.

On January 5, 1996, appellant sent appellee a letter which
states:
To the extent you agree to all of the terms of our
written agreement as provided to you, there will be no
attorney's fee relating to Robert Rees and Fabian &
Clendenin other than the attorney's fee associated with
the settlement received concerning Carolyn Clark and
the attorney's fees associated with the rejected/
pending settlement offer/agreement concerning Brian
Barkey.
Defendant's Exhibit 10.

Thus, almost a year after appellant

first presented to appellee the proposed fee agreement he
acknowledged appellee had not agreed to it. Finally, appellant
knew appellee had no money to pay appellant an hourly fee but
represented him anyway, spending 123 hours to achieve the
$3,250.00 settlement.

Plaintiff's Exhibit's 1 & 3.

Second, the trial court found the parties had a verbal
agreement by which appellee agreed to accept a one-third
contingent fee.

In support of that finding, there is

overwhelming evidence that the parties had a verbal agreement
memorialized by correspondence or an agreement expressed by the
correspondence itself.

Appellee expressly conditioned
8

appellant's authority to accept the settlement offers on
appellant's taking a one-third contingent fee.

In a December 12,

1995, letter to appellant, appellee memorializes the parties'
prior verbal agreement that appellant take a one-third contingent
fee and expresses that agreement as a condition to appellant's
authority to accept both offers.

Plaintiff's Exhibit 9.

In a

January 12, 1996, letter to appellant, appellee reiterates that
condition as to the Barkey settlement.

Plaintiff's Exhibit 11,

pg. 10. In return correspondence, appellant expressed his assent
to that condition and expresses he has accepted the Barkey offer
on the basis of appellee's January 12, 1996, letter.

Id, pg. 11.

Appellant argues the chronology of the correspondence
seeking and giving authority to accept the Clark offer shows that
appellee expressed the condition after appellant already had
accepted the offer on appellee's behalf.

That argument is belied

by appellant's acceptance of that condition as to the Barkey
offer.

And there is ample evidence that the correspondence

merely records a condition which appellee had imposed verbally
before appellant accepted the Clark offer on appellee's behalf.
In a December 7, 1995, letter, appelljfe memorializes a
telephone conversation between the parties and expresses his
intent to accept the Clark offer the next day.

Appellant's

Exhibit 12. Appellant accepted the Clark offer by a letter dated
December 8, 1995. Id. pg. 3.

On December 12, 1995, appellee

9

faxed a letter to appellant which states he received appellant's
December 7 letter the day before, on December 11, and states:
Our verbal agreement was that I will pay you (the
attorney), thirty-three percent of the proceeds I may
receive in this lawsuit if you represent me. I have
already paid you $200.00 for the court costs.
Based on this agreement (above) only, you may
accept settlement offers from both Miss Clark and Mr.
Barkey at the same time (in the amount of three
thousand dollars).
Appellee's Exhibit 3 (parentheses in original).
That exchange amply supports the trial court's finding that
the parties had a verbal agreement prior to appellant's
acceptance of the Clark offer which appellee's December 12, 1995,
letter memorializes.

That reasonable minds may draw different

conclusions from that evidence is not sufficient ground on which
to upset the trial court's finding. Pollesche v. Transamerican
Ins. Co.. 497 P.2d 236, 238 (Utah 1972).

The trial court's

findings are not clearly erroneous and its judgment should stand.

B.

APPELLANT FAILED TO MARSHALL THE EVIDENCE
IN SUPPORT OF HIS APPEAL.

To challenge the trial court's fact findings successfully,
it is the appellant's burden to cite all the evidence in the
record in support of the judgment, including all reasonable
inferences, and then demonstrate why, even when viewed in the
light most favorable to the trial court, the evidence is
insufficient to support the finding under attack.
10

Grayson Roper,

Ltd. v. Finlinson, 782 P.2d 467 (Utah 1989);

Harker v.

Condominiums Forest Glen, Inc., 740 P.2d 1361, 1362

(Utah Ct.

App. 1987) . Here, appellant has done just the opposite.
Appellant merely has presented the evidence favorable to his case
and in the light least favorable to the trial court's judgment.
It is neither this Court's nor appellee's burden to search the
record for evidence which supports the judgment.

The following

few examples reveal appellant failed to marshall and present the
ample evidence in support of the trial court's judgment.
Appellant failed to present the evidence that appellee
specifically conditioned appellant's authority to accept both
settlement offers on appellant's taking a one-third contingent
fee.

The failure is especially marked as to the Barkey

settlement, as follows:
In appellee's January 12, 1996, letter to appellant,
appellee expresses the condition:
Our verbal agreement has been that I will pay you
thirty-three percent of any proceeds I may receive in
this case. Based on this agreement, you may accept any
settlement offer from Mr. Barkey.
Plaintiff's Exhibit 11, pg. 10.
In return correspondence, appellant expressed his assent to
that condition and expresses he has accepted the Barkey offer on
the basis of appellee's January 12, 1996, letter:
I have reviewed your fax of January 12, 1996. I
will accept $333.33 as my attorney fee with regard to
the recovery to be received from Mr. Barkey. I have
li

forwarded an acceptance of Mr. Barkey's offer to his
attorney. A copy of that letter is enclosed.
Id, pg. 11.
Appellant's letter goes on to impose additional conditions
on his willingness to accept a one-third contingent fee, but by
then the deal was done.

Id.

Appellant already accepted the

settlement offer on appellee's behalf.

He cannot accept the

condition, bind appellee to the settlement and unilaterally
impose additional conditions on his agreement with appellee after
the fact.
Appellant failed to reveal he presented the proposed
agreement to appellee several times, including once on or about
December 15, 1995, after he had represented appellee for almost a
year, after the claims against the lawyer and law firm were
dismissed and during the negotiations to settle the remaining
claims.

Record on Appeal, pp. 758:8 to 759:3, Defendant's

Exhibit 2.

Appellant's presenting the proposed fee agreement

again in December reveals appellee had not agreed to the contract
previously, as appellant has claimed.

Appellant also fails to

address the trial court's finding that appellant knew appellee
had no funds to hire a lawyer other than on a contingent fee but
represented him anyway, spending more than 123 hours to achieve
the $3,250.00 in settlement.
899:10;

Record on Appeal, pg. 898:24-

Plaintiff's Exhibits 1 & 3.

12

Appellant represented to this Court that the trial court
rejected his claim based on the proposed fee agreement because
appellant was unable to produce a signed contract.
Brief, pg 6.

Appellant's

In truth, the trial court's finding was based on

the evidence as revealed in appellee's brief and on substantial
other evidence.
Finally, as to the trial court's failure to award appellant
his costs in this action, appellant states in his brief:
the relief awarded was opposed by defendant."
false.

"All of

That simply is

From start to finish, appellee's theory of the case was

that appellant should be awarded a one-third contingent fee plus
costs in the previous lawsuit.

Record on Appeal, pg. 728:8-9

(opening statement), Record on Appeal, pg. .

(closing argument).

The trial court accepted appellee's theory of the case and denied
appellant's application for costs in this case.
Those are a few examples of appellant's myriad failures to
reveal to this Court evidence in support of the trial court's
judgment.

Appellant has failed altogether to carry his burden to

marshall the evidence.

C.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED
THE CLAIM FOR QUANTUM MERUIT.

Where there is an enforceable, expressed contract, it will
be enforced in lieu of the equitable remedy of quantum meruit.
Bailey-Allen Co., Inc. v. Kurzet, 876 P.2d 421, 425 (Utah App.
13

1994).

Here, based on its finding of an express, verbal

agreement between the parties by which appellant would accept a
one-third contingent fee, the trial court correctly concluded
that the equitable remedy of quantum meruit did not apply.
Record on Appeal, pg. 900:19-25.

D.

THE TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT ALSO MAY BE
UPHELD ON A THEORY OF QUANTUM MERUIT.

The Court of Appeals may uphold the trial court's judgment
on any proper grounds.
1995).

DeBry v. Noble, 889 P.2d 428, 444 (Utah

Here, the trial court's judgment may be upheld even if

quantum meruit applies to appellant's claims.
Quantum meruit has two branches:

"(1) contracts implied in

law, also known as quasi contracts or unjust enrichment, which
are not actions to enforce a contract but are actually actions to
require restitution;

and (2) contracts implied in fact, which

are contracts established by conduct.

Knight v. Post, 748 P.2d

1097 (Utah App. 1988).
1.

Contract Implied in Law.

To prevail under a theory of implied in law contract or
unjust enrichment, appellant must show three elements:
appellant conferred a benefit on appellee;
aware of the benefit;

and (3)

(2)

(1)

appellee was

appellee "retained the benefit

under such circumstances as to make it inequitable for him to
retain the benefit without payment of its value."
14

Knight,

748

P.2d at 1100. Thus, payment to appellant must relate in value to
the benefit conferred.

In specific, where the claim is for

services, one must prove that the amount of labor used and charge
for that labor are reasonable.
Inc..

Midwest Fabrication v. Woodex,

596 P.2d 581, 583 (Or. App. 1979)(claim for labor and

materials).
Here, in fact, appellee has received no benefit because
appellant refused to tender to him any of the small amounts
recovered, including appellee's rental deposit which the landlord
tendered to appellant instead of appellee.

Defendant's Exhibit

13; Record on Appeal, pg. 770:2-21.. But in theory, appellee has
received $3,250.00 as the proceeds of the lawsuit.

Appellant

claims to have spent over 123 hours to have obtained that
$3,250.00 benefit and desires to be paid $10,000.00 for having
conferred it.

Plaintiff's Exhibits 1 & 3.

To obtain that

$3,250.00, appellant sued the landlord, the other tenant, the
house sitter, the Robert Reese, the landlord's lawyer and Fabian
8c Clendenin, the lawyer's firm.

The claims against the lawyer

and law firm were dismissed with prejudice and found to be
frivolous. Defendant's Exhibit 15; Record on Appeal, pp. 7 82:19784:14 & 836:24-837:1. According to the express authority
appellee gave appellant to accept those offers, appellant
suggests that one-third of the $3,250.00 is a reasonable amount
to pay appellant for the benefit he conferred on appellee.

15

2.

Contract Implied in Fact.

To prevail under a theory of implied in fact contract,
plaintiff must show three elements:

(1)

defendant requested

plaintiff to perform the work; (2) defendant expected plaintiff
to compensate him;

and

(3)

defendant knew or should have known

plaintiff expected compensation.

Knight,

748 P.2d at 1100.

Once again, however, the amount of that compensation is the
service's reasonable value.
(Utah App. 1987) .

Davies v. Olsen, 746 P.2d 264, 269

"Technically, recovery in contract implied in

fact is the amount the parties intended as the contract price.
If that amount is unexpressed, courts will infer that the parties
intended the amount to be the reasonable market value of the
appellant's services."

Davies v. Olsen, 746 P.2d 264, 269 (Utah

App. 1987) . Here, the evidence at trial revealed the parties
expressly intended the contract price to be one-third of the
settlement proceeds.

Record on Appeal, pp. 899:25-900:8. But

failing that evidence, the reasonable market value of appellant's
services is the professional standard of one-third contingent on
recovery.

16

E.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING
APPELLANTS CLAIM FOR COSTS.

The party whose theory of the case is accepted by the trier
of fact prevails.

"A prevailing party is one who prevails on a

significant issue in the litigation and achieves some of the
benefits sought therein."

Frost v. Schroder & Co., Inc., 876

P.2d 126, 129 (Colo. App. 1994) citing
Weld, 809 P.2d 1059 (Colo. App. 1990).

Odenbaugh v. County of
"In identifying a

prevailing party for purposes of entitlement to an award of costs
pursuant to [the applicable statute], the focus should be upon
the countervailing claims and defenses asserted by the litigants,
rather than upon incidental independent factors that may affect
the ultimate monetary judgment."

Frost, 876 P.2d at 129.

Here, appellant proposed he should awarded a 100% contingent
fee or a quantum meruit award of $9,999.99.
pg.

Record on Appeal,

Appellee proposed appellant should be awarded a one-third

contingent fee plus costs in the previous action.

The Court

awarded appellant a one-third contingent fee plus costs in the
previous action.

Although the judgment awards money to appellant

it is in the amount which appellee proposed.

Appellee prevailed.

Appellee could be awarded costs but he incurred no recoverable
costs and submitted no cost bill.
Rule 54(d)(1) states in relevant part: "... costs shall be
awarded as of course to the prevailing party unless the court
otherwise directs..." Although cost awards are matters of
17

course, they are not mandatory as appellant argues.

The trial

court "can exercise reasonable discretion in regard to the
allowance of costs..."

Hatanaka v. Struhs, 738 P.2d 1052, 1055

(Utah Ct. App. 1989); Frampton v. Wilson, 605 P.2d 771, 773-74
(Utah 1980).

The trial court's judgment to charge neither party

costs is within its discretion and should stand.

F.

APPELLEE APPLIES TO RECOVER THE FEES HE INCURS
TO DEFEND AGAINST THIS FRIVOLOUS APPEAL.

Pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 33, appellee
applies to the Court to recover the attorney's fees he will spend
in defense of this appeal. Appellee understands the Rule 33
remedy only applies in egregious cases and he makes this
application cautiously and advisedly.
P.2d 365,

See Porco v. Porco, 752

(Utah Ct. App. 1988). But the present appeal has no

reasonable legal or factual basis, has been taken with no
reasonable likelihood of prevailing, is frivolous, and never
should have been brought.

See Id.;

O'Brien v. Rush, 744 P.2d

306, 309-11 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
Appellant made no attempt to meet his burden to marshall the
evidence.

Likely, that is because if appellant had marshalled

the evidence he could not make even a colorable argument the
judgment should be set aside.

Instead, he presented only the

evidence favorable to his position in the light most favorable to
the result he desires, not in the light most favorable to the
18

trial court's judgment.

In doing so, appellant misrepresented to

this Court the evidence before the trial court.

Appellee

respectfully requests the Court to award him the attorney's fees
he will incur to defend this frivolous appeal.

VIII.

CONCLUSION.

There is ample evidence to support the trial court's
carefully made findings. They are not clearly erroneous.
Appellant made no attempt to marshall the evidence which would
have supported that conclusion.
The trial court accepted appellee's theory of the case and
awarded appellant the amount appellee proposed.

Appellee

prevailed and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
denying appellant's application for costs.
Appellee respectfully requests the Court to deny this appeal
and affirm the trial court's judgment.

Finally, appellee

requests the Court to award him the attorney's fees he will incur
to defend this frivolous appeal.
Respectfully submitted on Novjember 21, 1997.

x

Richard G. Hackwell
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I certify that on November 21, 1997, two correct copies of
the appellee's brief were mailed to the following:
Thor B. Roundy, Esq.
230 South 500 East #270
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 364-3229
Dated November 21, 1997.
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